



CORRUPTION AND INSTITUTIONAL COLLAPSE: A FIFTEEN-YEAR ANALYSIS (2010–2025) OF PRISON BREAKS IN NIGERIA'S CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES



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Abstract

In criminology, punishment serves as a mechanism for addressing those who violate boundaries of tolerance typically through confinement in correctional centres in the form of custody, rehabilitation, and reintegration. This reflects a punitive philosophy of punishment. Prior to 2010, prison breaks in Nigeria were generally isolated incidents, lacking coordination or links to organised crime or insurgency. However, from 2010 onwards, the Nigeria Correctional System has encountered increasing challenges, particularly systemic corruption and frequent prison escapes, which threaten institutional credibility and national security. This study explored the relationship between corruption and prison breaks in Nigeria correctional facilities from 2010 to 2025. Utilising Routine Activity Theory and Broken Windows Theory, the research employed a mixed-method design, drawing on quantitative data and qualitative interviews from governmental and civil society sources. Results indicated a strong link between corruption -evidence in bribery, nepotism, embezzlement, and collusion with inmates and insider assistance in prison escapes, such as disabling surveillance, unlocking security systems, or bypassing perimeter checks. The study concluded by recommending better staff remuneration, anti-corruption training, enhanced digital surveillance, and strict enforcement of disciplinary procedures.

Keywords: corruption, prison breaks, institutional trust, national security, Nigeria correctional system

Introduction

Until the late 1960s, penal philosophy was grounded in the belief that individuals committed crimes out of rational choice. Therefore, harsh punishments were seen as necessary to deter potential offenders, a view supported by thinkers like Beccaria, 1764 and Bentham, 1789. This classical perspective emphasised deterrence and proportional punishment, often resulting in lengthy prison terms, particularly for individuals from lower socio-economic backgrounds. However, advancements in criminology brought about a paradigm shift toward a reformist approach. This new perspective introduced new ideas.

- i. That extended punishment can lead to stigma, labelling and repeat offending, called *recidivism* – suggesting the penal system may do more harm than good.
- ii. That law enforcement practices are often biased and unfair, especially toward the economically disadvantaged

Within this reformist framework, judges are encouraged to ensure that sentences reflect the gravity of offence, while also considering rehabilitation. Processed offender should receive counselling and support to aid their reintegration into society. In recent years, however, Nigeria correctional system has struggled to provide such counselling and rehabilitation due to systemic corruption. This failure has contributed to organised prison breaks, weakening institutional trust and threatening national security.

Literature Review

Corruption is commonly understood as the abuse of entrusted authority for personal or private gain (Transparency International, 2023). Within correctional institutions, corruption assumes multiple dimensions, including bribery, embezzlement, extortion, and collusion between inmates and prison officials. In the Nigerian context, corruption in correctional centres often manifests through the diversion of public funds, unauthorized granting of privileges to inmates, and the deliberate compromise of institutional rules and security procedures (Alemika & Chukwuma, 2001; Agbiboa, 2012). These practices not only undermine institutional effectiveness but also weaken the overall security architecture of correctional facilities.

Prison break, or jail escape, refers to the unlawful exit of inmates from correctional custody, typically achieved through force, deception, or external assistance. Such incidents may result from internal lapses such as negligence, poor supervision, or compromised personnel as well as external attacks by organized criminal groups or insurgents (Okunola & Adebayo, 2013).

Preventive measures against prison breaks generally include the provision of adequate funding, modernization of security infrastructure, regular staff training, and the enforcement of strict accountability systems. International correctional models, particularly the Scandinavian approach, emphasize humane treatment, rehabilitation, and reduced overcrowding as essential strategies for maintaining order and minimizing escape attempts (Pratt, 2008; Coyle, 2015).

Overview of Prison Breaks in Nigeria (2010–2025)

Between 2010 and 2025, Nigeria has experienced a troubling pattern of prison breaks, many of which have occurred on a large scale and with significant security implications. Reports indicate that several correctional facilities across states such as Edo, Kogi, Imo, and Abia have been attacked, resulting in the escape of thousands of inmates (Amnesty International, 2021; Eze, 2020). These incidents have often been linked to broader security challenges, including insurgency, armed banditry, and coordinated external assaults on custodial centres.

Scholarly and institutional reports consistently identify systemic weaknesses within the Nigerian correctional system as contributing factors. These include chronic overcrowding, deteriorating infrastructure, inadequate staffing, and poor funding (Nte, 2011; Owan & Ekpe, 2022; Sule et al., 2021). Although the transformation of the Nigerian Prisons Service into the Nigerian Correctional Service in 2019 was intended to introduce reforms, evidence suggests that structural inefficiencies and governance deficits persist (Ajah & Nweke, 2021).

The frequency and scale of prison breaks within this period point to deeper institutional challenges that extend beyond physical infrastructure, highlighting the need to examine underlying governance issues such as corruption and administrative failure.

The Nexus between Corruption and Prison Breaks in Nigeria

A growing body of literature underscores the pervasive role of corruption in weakening Nigeria's criminal justice system. Earlier studies have documented how corruption contributes to poor prison conditions, including overcrowding, inadequate healthcare, and insufficient feeding of inmates (Nte, 2011; Owan & Ekpe, 2022). These studies further reveal that

correctional officials often engage in practices such as diversion of resources, extortion of inmates, and manipulation of administrative processes for personal gain.

Beyond its impact on inmate welfare, corruption plays a direct role in undermining prison security. For instance, bribery and collusion can lead to intentional negligence, unauthorized access to restricted areas, and the facilitation of escape plans (Agbiboa, 2012; Alemika, 2007). Similarly, corrupt procurement practices may result in the installation of substandard security infrastructure, thereby increasing institutional vulnerability to both internal and external breaches.

From a theoretical perspective, systemic corruption reflects broader institutional decay, which erodes accountability and weakens enforcement mechanisms within correctional facilities. As institutions become compromised, adherence to rules and procedures declines, creating an enabling environment for prison breaks to occur (Braithwaite, 1989). In such contexts, corruption not only coexists with security failures but actively drives them.

Despite the recognition of corruption as a structural challenge in Nigeria's correctional system, there remains a paucity of empirical studies that explicitly examine its role as a direct enabler of prison breaks over an extended period. Existing research has largely focused on prison conditions and criminal justice inefficiencies, with limited attention to the longitudinal relationship between corruption and custodial security breaches. This gap provides a strong justification for the present study, which seeks to investigate how corruption has influenced the occurrence and dynamics of prison breaks in Nigeria between 2010 and 2025.

Theoretical Framework

To understand the relationship between corruption and prison breaks, this study drew on two complementary criminological theories: Routine Activity Theory and Broken Windows Theory. Routine Activity Theory (RAT), developed by Cohen and Felson (1979), explains that a crime occurs when three elements converge in time and space: a motivated offender, a suitable target, and the absence of a capable guardian. Within Nigeria's correctional facilities, this convergence is evident. Inmates seeking to escape represent the motivated offenders; weak and porous prison infrastructure, including dilapidated perimeter fences, obsolete surveillance systems, and inadequate physical barriers, constitutes the suitable target or opportunity structure; and corrupt or complicit prison officers, who permit security lapses in exchange for bribes or personal favours, represent the absence of capable guardianship. Applied to the Nigerian context, RAT suggests that corruption does not merely coexist with weak security; it actively erodes the guardianship function that would otherwise prevent escapes, thereby increasing the likelihood of prison breaks.

Complementing this, Broken Windows Theory, proposed by Wilson and Kelling (1982), argues that when minor disorders and infractions are tolerated without consequence, they signal an absence of oversight that emboldens more serious offending. Transposed onto the correctional setting, small and seemingly tolerable acts of corruption, such as officers running errands for high-profile inmates or accepting bribes for uniforms, boots, and other privileges, function as the "broken windows" of prison management. When such infractions go unchecked, they normalise a culture of impunity that, over time, escalates into the systemic failures that enable mass jailbreaks.

The two theories illuminate a shared pathway through which weak governance and institutional fragility translate into custodial insecurity, expressed through four interlocking conditions. The first is persistent infrastructural collapse: many Nigerian correctional facilities were constructed during the colonial era and have received little structural renovation since the 1960s, leaving

them vulnerable to collapse. The partial destruction of the perimeter fence at Suleja Medium Security Prison by heavy rainfall on 24 April 2022, which enabled 119 inmates to escape, and the flood-related collapse that triggered 281 escapes at Maiduguri in 2024, illustrate how physical decay directly creates the “suitable target” that RAT describes.

The second condition is acute underfunding and mismanagement, which leaves routine maintenance, closed-circuit television, drone surveillance, and other basic security infrastructure absent or non-functional. The third is overcrowding compounded by delayed trials: with over seventy percent of inmates classified as awaiting trial, and many facilities operating above stated capacity, tension, desperation, and informal collusion between inmates and staff become more likely, further weakening custodial oversight. The fourth condition is corruption and insider complicity, whereby frequent jailbreaks involve varying degrees of insider collusion, lax internal supervision, and weak institutional oversight, the very absence of “capable guardianship” that RAT identifies as central to opportunistic crime.

Finally, insurgent exploitation of these vulnerabilities compounds the risk. Groups such as Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) have carried out armed assaults using explosives and firearms against correctional facilities, exposing the fragility of the Nigerian state and its security architecture. Limited intelligence-sharing and weak inter-agency cooperation further undermine the state's capacity to pre-empt such attacks, with direct implications for institutional legitimacy, the rule of law, and national security.

Methodology

This study adopted a mixed-methods research design to provide a holistic understanding of the relationship between corruption and prison breaks in Nigeria's correctional facilities. Quantitative data provided statistical insight into patterns and predictors of recidivism, while qualitative data captured the underlying institutional and social dynamics that numbers alone cannot reveal.

Population and Sampling

The population of the study comprised all serving correctional staff and all re-arrested inmates attached to the correctional facilities across Nigeria's six geopolitical zones that experienced a documented prison break between 2010 and 2025 (see Table 1 for the full chronology of incidents). From this population, a sample of 750 respondents was selected using a stratified purposive sampling technique, comprising 500 re-arrested inmates and 250 correctional staff, including officers, counsellors, and administrators, drawn proportionately from the six geopolitical zones.

Instruments

In line with the recommendation to streamline the data collection instruments, the study relied on two principal methods rather than a wider battery of tools. First, documentary analysis was conducted on official records, including Nigerian Correctional Service reports (Nigerian Correctional Service, 2024), and monitoring reports from the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Independent Corrupt Practices Commission & Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, 2024), as well as Amnesty International (2021), to reconstruct the chronology and circumstances of prison break incidents between 2010 and 2025. Second, in-depth interviews were conducted with a purposively selected subset of respondents: correctional staff with over fifteen years of service, and re-arrested inmates who had spent over fifteen years in custody, drawn specifically from facilities that had experienced a prison break. This purposive focus ensured that respondents had first-hand institutional memory of both the routine operation of the correctional system and

the specific conditions surrounding escape incidents. A structured questionnaire, administered to the full sample of 750 respondents, supplied the quantitative data analysed in the following section.

Chronology of Prison Break Incidents, 2010–2025

The dataset draws on twenty-two documented prison break incidents in Nigeria between 2010 and 2025, compiled from Federal Ministry of Interior records (Federal Ministry of Interior, 2025) and cross-checked against media and civil society reports. A narrative discussion of the causes, patterns, and implications of these incidents is presented in the Literature Review's overview of prison breaks in Nigeria (2010–2025); this subsection presents the chronology strictly as the study's data source, in table form.

Date	Location	Summary
Sep 7, 2010	Bauchi	Boko Haram militants attacked the Bauchi Federal Prison; approximately 721 inmates escaped, with 5 deaths and 6 injuries.
Jun 2, 2012	Damaturu, Yobe	41 inmates escaped from Jimeta Prison following an attack by suspected Boko Haram members; 8 injuries recorded.
Jun 30, 2013	Akure, Ondo	An attack on Olokuta Medium Security Prison led to the escape of 175 inmates; 2 inmates killed.
Nov 2, 2014	Koton Karfe, Kogi	Suspected Boko Haram gunmen attacked Koton Karfe Medium Prison; 144 prisoners escaped, 1 inmate killed.
Nov 30, 2014	Ado-Ekiti	Sixty gunmen attacked Ado-Ekiti Federal Prison; 341 inmates escaped.
Jul 29, 2016	Koton Karfe, Kogi	Thirteen inmates escaped after a section of the prison wall and perimeter fence was brought down.
Aug 9, 2016	Nsukka, Enugu	Fifteen inmates escaped by breaking out of their cells.
Dec 27, 2017	Ikot Ekpene, Akwa Ibom	Thirty-six inmates escaped after attacking kitchen staff; 4 inmates died.
Jun 3, 2018	Minna, Niger	Gunmen freed over 200 inmates; 1 prison staff member and 1 motorcyclist killed.
Oct 28, 2019	Koton Karfe, Kogi	Flooding breached security; 122 inmates escaped.
Oct 19, 2020	Benin & Oko, Edo	Coordinated attacks during the #EndSARS protests led to the escape of approximately 1,993 inmates.
Oct 22, 2020	Okitipupa, Ondo	58 inmates freed during the #EndSARS protests.
Apr 5, 2021	Owerri, Imo	Gunmen freed 1,844 inmates.
Sep 13, 2021	Kabba, Kogi	240 inmates escaped; 2 security operatives killed.
Oct 22, 2021	Abolongo, Oyo	837 inmates escaped.
Apr 24, 2022	Suleja, Niger	Heavy rains damaged the perimeter fence; 119 inmates escaped.
Jul 5, 2022	Kuje, Abuja	ISWAP attacked the facility, freeing 879 inmates, including 64 terrorism suspects.
Sep 9, 2024	Maiduguri, Borno	Dam collapse and severe flooding led to 281 escapes.
Nov 28, 2024	Jos, Plateau	262 inmates released; 10 inmates and 1 security officer died.
Mar 28, 2025	Koton Karfe,	Inmates disabled surveillance and manipulated

Apr 20, 2025	Kogi Ilesa, Osun	padlocks; 12 escaped, 1 officer killed, 5 recaptured. Perimeter fence collapsed after heavy rain; 7 inmates escaped.
May 20, 2025	Ilesa, Osun	Further perimeter collapse from overnight rainfall enabled 7 inmates to escape.

Data Analysis

Quantitative data were analysed using SPSS (version 26). Descriptive statistics, comprising means, frequencies, and standard deviations, were first computed to summarise respondents' demographic characteristics and their general perceptions of rehabilitation services within Nigeria's correctional system. Chi-square tests of association were then conducted to examine relationships between categorical variables, such as access to rehabilitation programmes and recidivism status; for instance, a chi-square test revealed a statistically significant relationship between lack of vocational training and the likelihood of re-offending, $\chi^2(4, N = 750) = 32.58$, $p < .01$. Binary logistic regression was subsequently employed to identify predictors of recidivism, with access to counselling, prison overcrowding, exposure to corruption, and participation in educational programmes entered as independent variables. The overall model was statistically significant, Nagelkerke $R^2 = .41$, with lack of counselling ($OR = 2.8$, $p < .001$) and exposure to corrupt practices ($OR = 3.2$, $p < .001$) emerging as the strongest predictors of recidivism.

Qualitative data, comprising transcripts from the in-depth interviews and supporting documentary sources, were imported into NVivo software for coding. Thematic analysis followed Braun and Clarke's (2006) six-phase framework, comprising familiarisation, initial coding, theme searching, theme review, theme definition, and write-up, allowing the qualitative themes to enrich and contextualise the statistical findings.

Results

The quantitative results point to a substantial gap in access to rehabilitation. Seventy-eight percent of re-arrested inmates reported having no access to vocational training or psychological counselling during their incarceration, while sixty-five percent of prison staff acknowledged that rehabilitation programmes exist largely on paper, with little or no practical implementation. This gap was not incidental: a significant association ($p < .01$) was found between the absence of rehabilitation services and the likelihood of re-offending, and both the chi-square and logistic regression analyses confirmed that lack of counselling and exposure to corruption were the strongest statistical predictors of recidivism among the variables tested. Taken together, these results suggest that Nigeria's correctional system is functioning primarily as a custodial rather than a rehabilitative institution, a pattern that, following Routine Activity Theory, leaves a population of motivated offenders with strong incentives to seek escape.

The qualitative findings help to explain how this custodial failure connects to prison breaks. Three themes emerged from the interview and documentary data. The first, corruption and negligence, captured recurrent reports from both inmates and staff of the diversion of rehabilitation funds and the acceptance of bribes in parole decisions, corroborating the capable-guardian failure identified in the Theoretical Framework. The second theme, stigmatisation and labelling, reflected the difficulties former inmates faced reintegrating into society because of the enduring stigma of imprisonment, a pattern consistent with the reformist critique of punitive penology discussed earlier. The third theme, institutional decay, emerged from staff accounts of poor salaries, outdated facilities, and inadequate training; several respondents linked their own low remuneration directly to their vulnerability to corrupt inducements.

This third theme is reinforced by a comparative review of correctional salary structures across Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Table 2). Nigerian correctional officers earn a basic monthly salary equivalent to a small fraction of their counterparts in comparator countries, even after allowances are included, a disparity that respondents repeatedly cited as a driver of corrupt behaviour. This comparison lends empirical weight to the qualitative theme of institutional decay: officers who are poorly remunerated relative to international peers face a stronger material incentive to accept bribes, consistent with the small-infractions mechanism described in Broken Windows Theory.

Country / Grade	Approximate Basic Pay + Benefits
Nigeria (NCoS) – Junior (Assistant/Inspector, CONPASS 3–5)	₦60,000–₦100,000 + 30–80% allowances
Nigeria (NCoS) – Intermediate (Senior Inspector–Deputy Superintendent, CONPASS 6–12)	₦120,000–₦250,000 + allowances
Nigeria (NCoS) – Senior management (Controller–Assistant Controller-General, CONPASS 13–15)	₦250,000–₦400,000 + allowances
Nigeria (NCoS) – Top tier (Deputy Controller-General–Controller-General, CONPASS 16+)	₦300,000+ consolidated allowances
South Africa – Correctional/junior officer	R15,000–R26,000 + benefits (R17,000–R31,000)
South Africa – Senior officer (10+ years)	R20,000–R35,000 + benefits
Kenya – Prison officer (median)	KES 832,000 p.a. + KES 5,600 benefits
Kenya – Senior officer	KES 1.2 million p.a. + KES 10,000 benefits
United Kingdom – Prison officer	£30,000–£40,000 p.a. + London allowance
United Kingdom – Senior officer	£40,000–£55,000 p.a. + London allowance
United States – Median officer	US\$53,000–US\$61,000 p.a. + benefits
United States – Senior officer	US\$68,600–US\$76,000 p.a. + benefits

Sources: CONPASS Consolidated Paramilitary Salary Structure, Federal Ministry of Interior, Abuja; Worldwide Salaries and Paylab (2025); salary.com (2025).

Discussion of Findings

This study set out to examine how corruption has functioned as a direct enabler of prison breaks in Nigeria between 2010 and 2025, using Routine Activity Theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979) and Broken Windows Theory (Wilson & Kelling, 1982) as guiding frameworks. Corruption is understood here, following Nye (1967) and the World Bank (2007), as the abuse of public office for private gain, encompassing bribery, nepotism, and the misappropriation of public resources.

The findings offer strong support for the study's central proposition. Consistent with Routine Activity Theory, the statistical evidence that lack of counselling (OR = 2.8, $p < .001$) and exposure to corruption (OR = 3.2, $p < .001$) were the strongest predictors of recidivism indicates that inmates who experience both custodial neglect and corrupt practices are significantly more likely to reoffend, behaviour consistent with a population of motivated offenders operating in an environment where capable guardianship has been eroded. The qualitative accounts of diverted rehabilitation funds, bribery in parole decisions, and the alleged

facilitation of the escape of insurgent-linked detainees, as in the Kuje prison break of 5 July 2022, extend this picture from statistical association to observed mechanism: corrupt staff did not merely fail to prevent breaches, they actively enabled them.

The comparative salary data (Table 2) situate these findings within Broken Windows Theory. Nigerian correctional officers' basic remuneration lags substantially behind that of comparable officers in South Africa, Kenya, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Respondents' own accounts linking poor pay to routine, low-level corrupt practices, such as accepting bribes for privileges or running informal errands for inmates, illustrate precisely the mechanism Wilson and Kelling (1982) describe: unaddressed minor infractions normalise a permissive institutional culture that, left unchecked, escalates into large-scale security failures.

These findings align closely with prior Nigerian scholarship. Agbibo (2012) and Alemika (2007) similarly identified bribery and collusion as direct enablers of security breaches in Nigerian public institutions, while Nte (2011) and Owan and Ekpe (2022) linked chronic underfunding and poor prison conditions to correctional dysfunction more broadly. The present study extends this literature by demonstrating, through a fifteen-year longitudinal dataset, the specific pathway through which everyday corruption escalates into organised, large-scale prison breaks, a link that earlier research had identified in principle but rarely traced empirically over an extended period.

At a broader level, these results reinforce the reformist critique of Nigeria's penal philosophy discussed in the Introduction. A correctional system that functions in practice as a punitive rather than rehabilitative institution, and that is simultaneously compromised by corruption, produces a self-reinforcing cycle: neglected inmates become more likely to reoffend or seek escape, while poorly remunerated and inadequately supervised staff become more susceptible to complicity. The consequence, as the data show, is a pattern of recurrent institutional failure, high recidivism, prison unrest, and periodic mass escapes, that has accumulated into a genuine threat to national security.

Conclusion and Recommendations

This study set out to investigate the relationship between corruption and prison breaks in Nigeria's correctional facilities over a fifteen-year period, 2010 to 2025. Drawing on Routine Activity Theory and Broken Windows Theory, and on a mixed-methods dataset combining documentary analysis, in-depth interviews, and a structured survey of 750 correctional staff and re-arrested inmates, the study found consistent evidence that corruption functions not merely as a background condition but as an active, direct enabler of prison breaks. Statistically, corruption exposure and lack of access to rehabilitation emerged as the strongest predictors of recidivism; qualitatively, respondents repeatedly linked poor staff remuneration, diverted rehabilitation funds, and bribery in parole decisions to specific instances of institutional compromise, including the facilitation of high-profile escapes. Structural vulnerabilities, including colonial-era infrastructure left unrenovated, chronic underfunding, overcrowding driven by prolonged pre-trial detention, and, in some cases, direct insurgent exploitation of weak security, compounded these effects.

Taken together, these findings answer the study's central research problem: they show that Nigeria's correctional crisis of the past fifteen years cannot be adequately explained by physical or infrastructural decay alone, nor by insurgent activity alone, but must be understood as the product of an institutional environment in which corruption has steadily eroded the capable guardianship that both prevents everyday escapes and protects against externally orchestrated

attacks. This reframes prison breaks not simply as security failures but as governance failures with direct implications for public safety and national security.

On this basis, addressing Nigeria's prison break crisis requires action on several fronts simultaneously, rather than reliance on any single measure. Structured vocational and psychological rehabilitation programmes need to be implemented and adequately funded, so that custody is not the sole function correctional facilities perform. Correctional staff require retraining toward a rehabilitative rather than purely punitive philosophy, alongside dedicated anti-corruption training and the adoption of modern digital surveillance systems. Improving the salary and welfare structure of correctional staff in line with global comparators, as shown in Table 2, would directly reduce the material incentives that currently sustain low-level corruption. Independent oversight bodies should be established to monitor prison management and to enforce disciplinary procedures consistently, while aftercare and reintegration services for released inmates should be strengthened to reduce the stigmatisation that contributes to recidivism. Implemented together, these measures address both sides of the routine-activity equation identified in this study: reducing the incentives that produce motivated offenders, and restoring the guardianship capacity that corruption has eroded.

Implications for Policy and Future Research in Fragile Democracy

At the policy level, these findings point to the need to strengthen anti-corruption agencies and judicial efficiency. This requires a meaningful upgrade in the resources and capacity of institutions such as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission, including adequate funding, improved staffing, modern information technology systems, and streamlined legal processes capable of reducing case backlogs and delays. Mandatory asset disclosure and enhanced transparency requirements for prison officials and administrators would further reduce opportunities for corrupt enrichment. Technology-driven systems, including digital record-keeping, electronic inmate tracking, and CCTV surveillance linked directly to EFCC and ICPC monitoring systems, would strengthen institutional oversight and support inter-agency collaboration.

Beyond immediate policy responses, this study points to a broader research agenda. Future research should examine how weak institutions operating within a fragile democracy shape state legitimacy, the rule of law, and national security more generally, extending beyond the correctional sector to other public institutions vulnerable to similar patterns of corruption-driven collapse.

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